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THE COMMON VIEW i5 that Hindu philosophy is committed to one of the cc;mccptions of the Trans~endent: whether understood as Brahman (the Ah-
sol1.1te) of Vedanta met;iphysics; or as fl,•ara, in one of his triune: rorms of Siva., 
Vhnu. or. Brahma or the sect:uian traditions; or as Saktt an exclusively feminine 
divinity, such as the tenifting Goddess KiJi of the Ulntric sei;ts; or perhaps as 
·the divinely sacred offspring, .such as the elephanl-hea.dcd Oanda and his brother 
Kintikeya. And there are; of course, colorful variations to this wondrous theme, 
with a profusion of images in tile vast pantheon of Hindu gods, goddesses, 
avataras, partia1 divine embodiments. and so on. Understandably, rhen, scholars 
have attempted to encompass the bulk of Hindu be.liefs variously under one of 
these categories: polytheism. organized polytheism, pantheism. panenthc::ism, 
hcnotheism:1 monotheism. monism, non-dualism, OI', ~ved more puzzling. :all of 
the$e somehow wrapped into one (hence the ubiquitous '"Onc.nr::~s:·). By and 
large, it is a~$umc.d lha.t Hinduism pr-ogre.sscd from a primitive polytheism (in its 
pre-Aryan, ea.tthy roots) through henotbeism (In R..& and Atharva Vedas) atJd 
monistic: idealism (of the Upani5a.ds), towards a form of monot~ch;tn, which lhc 
vast majority of Hindus arc apparently seen to espouse.I Not so well known, 
pnrtly because of its-,neglect by OricntaJisls, is a contrary posjtion thal moves 
away from all such conceptions, and which could also be said to reject .. Ood-
talk'' alto~ethcr: indeed, here we come: rather c:Jose to atheism (even •'a-1hcolo-
gieu) in the Hindu tradition. This is not merely a whimsical sentimeJlt which 
could be pcffuhctorily dismissed as an aberration within the tradition. There 
seems robe an argument for this contni.ry position, or at least a.rgumcnts ag:ilinst 
those whose theological discourse m.igllt pers~e them otherwise_ Jn general 
terms, let us say lhat lhcre is scope wilhin Hindu philosophy f'or an articulated 
•1 wtn1ld like: 10 c.-prcss my 1hanks ltt Dr. J~lyn. Dunph)' for 10\ng 1htoup ;\draft or 1his. p<lilll!r 
and m:ikir.1: a n~nnber or \1$~fllf wqei;:tiMs. 
15'1'11!, f~r e~pl~. A. L. Basham. "KllSl':ilA.'" Rt:lirliiu$ Trodiliom • tOct .. 19'1~). 1-B. More 
ins11"1.1Clive in 1his conlr::ii.\ i!I Bashitm's erudite !iurv~ Qf "Hindtdsm·· if' R. C. Zachl!CI", ed., 'I~ 
Concts~ .Encyc/opa~di4 of Lilting FaiJJu (Londori.IBo.<:ton; 8£&con Presa. 196'). ZachoCl'':s works g[I 
Hilldiri:;m, Ctipec:ia.11}' hi& lmm;l:arion of •be Bh"8"~tta-8ild C01ford; The CluCJ1dan Press. 1974). and 
~ M'y.nlcism, Sact~d 11.nd Profo~ (O:llfon:I: The CW'endu111 Pren, 1968}, be:1ray a distinctive 
monolheis1ic tt:ading ot cloissical Hind1.1ism. Cf. Mu l'dOUer-, ~ Sir s,~t~m:s of lndEan rmtosoplt)I 
{London: l.Angs.man, Ori::t:n, 1928); and Do11ald and J1:.an Jc;iJm!i.on, GfHl and God~ i11 Hindiiism (New 
Delhi~ Amald-Hcini;m21Ul, 1972). 
"* This reprinced anide ~s d-:dicalcd to th~ memol')' of Dr. Wilhelm Halbfass. dep.:irted May 2000. 
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c:ritique of all theologies. res1.1ltinG ~o the expression of profound doubts about the 
.-eaUty of a supremely divine being, and. about tbe absolutes of metaphysics. 
The term ··Mimarpsa," si,enifyirig an exe,getica.I-hermeneutical enterprise and 
synonymous with the .system or school known by this name, is assoi::iated with 
this· critique or doubl; I say .. doubt" and not the 5tronger .. skepticism'" associ-
ated with Buddhism, and later with Hum.: in the West. for ri;asons that will 
become dcar~r in the dis~ussion. Ta hint at itjust a little:. l bclii:vc the Mimiqi:si 
was predii;posed towards a deconstruction of "cnto-theo-Jago&'" of the kind that 
had emerged from within the broad Indian tradition, but did not develop this into 
a risorovs program, cxl!epc to suggest its bare outline. 
JI, MiMA~SA 11os .ii.STIKA. 
i. Astika ve~us Nd.ui/ui 
The Mi'marp!!a is one orthe six major '"orthodox•• schools (darsanas) of Hindu 
philosophieaJ theology. The term used in the tradition for 0 orthodoxyn is 4.uiktJ, 
and it is contrasted with ruis#kt1. or ••hcicrodo1ty," or bctti::r still, ''non-ortho--
dox. •t 
Much debate fo J-lindu rheoJogy (:enters around whcthcl'" a particular view or 
system of thought is cistik"' or na.stil«l. The assumption in the tradition i.s that to 
be an asrika one must, al the very least, affirm the supremacy of the Veda, the 
scriptural canon that scls Hindu.ism apart from all other religions. The corpus of 
Veda, or Vedas, is collectively characterized as lruti, ••that whic.h is hei;ird" (i.e.., 
having been transmined orally from many generations past). The Veda constitures 
lhc: primary .. revelatory" tradition of Brahmanical Hinduism. A secondary or 
derivative sourc~ is charnc:terized as smrti, the '·recollected.·• Those who deny 
the validity of the Veda are by definition niistikas Oitc:raDy, not of iistika} and 
comprise. in the broad lndian philosophical tradition, the materialists Cirvika or 
Lokayata. the Ajivik.as, the Ja.inas, the Buddhists, and an assortment of sophists, 
skeptics, agnostks, and detractors from the Veda.i The Jainas and the Buddhists.~ 
in particular, based the aulf:iority for thi:.ir parfa:ular beliefs entirely on sources 
that .woul4 be re;arded (by orlhodox Hindus) as inimical to the authority of the 
Veda. 
2. The M'i"maqtsA as Astikas 
The MimiQ'lsi illvariably regarded itself as firmJy rooted in the astika or 
mainstream orthodox tradition_ Moreover~ later Mimamsa followers (post9sixth 
century C.E.) set out to revive and revivify the astik"' tradition by giving 
prominence to Vedic sii.dhan.a or praxis, which was 1hought ro ha"~ waned dur;ng 
the height of Buddhist influence in India. The Hindu sectarian renascence, already 
gaining strength, was taken ~dvantage of by the MimiilJlsakas (followers of the 
rFor discussion on theli!:, ~II!:~ O:i!I;! Reipc, Tl'" JVntirralis1iC' TradJ1ion In Jndlun Tho"glu, 1961 (Dt.lhi: 
.. Mo1i&al Banarsidass. RF- l!J64), chPS. 4. 7, 81, On }Jtvikaa. ace A. L. Basham. The Hi:uoey atJ.d 
J)ucrrl11c3 <>/th~ AJi11ikt1s (OcJhi: M<tlilal B<111<1r~id;in, '9511. On JajnH, .see S. Oopala11, Ou1li1"s of 
lc.lnisni lI>l;!lhi; Wil~:y Eastern Pvt. Ltd., 19,!h al\d Y. J. Pudmani.iiob, A Comparative Scu.dy t>f 1lt.r 
Jafna Th.~(;t"les of ~irellity ~'Id /{nowltdge {Delhi: Molilal Banarsidass, 1986). 
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Mimirrisii.). Although the Buddhist University ot'N~landa was still flourishing and 
there were skilled Buddhist d'alecticians arou.nd, certain. other factqrs. possibly 
internal to the Buddhist community, are said lO have contributed to the gradual 
decline of Buddhism after Nagarjuna·s palmy days (c. 150 C.E.).1 
The Mirniilllsakas appealed to moral arg1.1ments in order to disc::redit the 
credibility of Buddhism. Was it, however, necessary for the Mlln~saka.s to 
rcolaim the territory of Hindu Dharma or ""Law" with asserfions or argumerits in 
favor of belief in Ood? It seemed not. What c-on~ernc:d them most was 'hat the 
Vedic culture had been eclipsed. 
Kllmlrila Bhana was perhaps the foremost among the Mima()lsa revivalists 
during this period. He lived in the seventh century (some say 590-650 C.E.; 
others 600-700 C.E.)" and was pl,'Obably a contcmporar-y of the &rcat 8uddhist 
dialcc:tieian Dh.atmakirti. 
While defending the orthodoxy of the MimiifJlsa. Kumarila was moved to 
complain that the MTmarpsa had, by and. large, come to be looked upon as a 
··heretical'f system. To the question "How so?" Kumarila replied that the: 
Mimi[J'lsa had been reduced ro the stat11s of Lokayata, or Carvaka-dar.fana. the 
syst~m of natutalistlc materialism with its patently. hedonistic ethic.~ 
Kumarila wanted to resist the incipient tendency to associate the MTmiqlsa 
with some form of debased belief in a ''this-worldly'" rcali1y, and hence to reject 
identification of the prevatent materialist .. naturaJistic system(s) with the school he 
led. Should this, howevet, be taken to mean that Kumirila wanted to assert or re-
assert belief in an "olh.c:r~worldlyn reality, such as a supra-natural order or a 
supremely transcendent being? No. It seem.s that his only concern was lhat the 
V~a should not be maligned with some ton'Upt form of' naturalism that bordered 
on materialism and hedonism. {Pcthaps he would have been less concerned had 
Mim~saka he.en called t·a realist who s.wears by the Veda"!). tn ord~r to rega\n 
orthodoxy for Mimilflsi, KumArUa had to elevate the status of the Veda (iastras) 
and make its authority unassailable. 
There were two possible ways of rescuing the orthodoxy claimed by the 
Mirnaf!\Sa: (a) by attributing the source of the Veda to a supreme divine being, 
whose very omniscience and omnipotenee would sanction the authority of the 
1Gopiaalh Kavita,i, Preface !o Gangamllha Jha's trnn!Sla.cjon or l(unu!.rila BhaUa's Ta"rraWJmika. 
Biblio1h~ca lndica 161 (Cah:uua; Asit1t~ Soi::iMy or B1!:11g,al, 1903 .. 192"): reprinted Sri Garib ~ 
Oriental Series N~. 9, 10 (DcllT!; S~r.sgufti ftublic:ations, 1983). vol. I. pp. vi-vii. . 
4lb:t1., p. vii: Bd !.eto Umcsha Mitra, ia At11li:ndu ~o Oa.npn::uha Jha, Pdrva. Mi~&lflSl in lt5 
S~ur~s (Varnna1i; Ba""te; tUridu Univ .• 1964). pp. 21-22. 
JKumlrila Bhana, SlokavtJt'ft{f(a (tarlrapada), IJ. # 10 (ct. Jha's tn.nslatioo, p. 2-acc note 9 below). 
-Cr. Oangiinntha. Jha translatio11s of "lolc.dyata•• "" ••;i.tb11i1:1n,'' :il1d "ii.r1ika" aa "ll'lti!ltie.'' Thi:. b 
p~tcntly miiih::"idin-g, panicularly in the c:t.~c: Qf lhc: ht!tl!r, f.;,r on~ cuuh.1 ,.till be an ii.r1ilm ."1nd no! 
!Je;li~ve in Oi:it.I; CIU'leTWi!:c: [he Mimii'l'ISI would have to be i:l.,ssifio:d ~s l'ltLrikrr. whii;;h to my k.nL)w[i;:.;ft~ 
l.'IQ oni: ha:;; e.\'~t di;mc. In his latcC" works, howi:v~r, Jha i.i mure: cautio1u. 
11 mav be noted thar 10 bi: chissJftitd as a rrd.ttlka fhct«od~} one would prc$umabl)" de.ny one or 
m~ or the. ftiltowinr. (i) belief in u afterlife; (ii) belief in thi: Vcd"; Ciiil belief in CCMI. But it docs not 
fblliYN .IN>m I.his that a Bimplc assmion of (iiiJ in i\$elf is $ufficicnt to tandel' Of\C an rJ.JtfkQ, at 11oted 
gbovc; ;and ir1~i were rlte c~e:, the Brahmanical prit:st& wovld not hi!.~ 11Xlked d<twn upon che new 
imivllb en their land, munely, 1he z.;i("O;l.:l1rians, Jc\!Js, Ctirlstian!I, nnd Muslims, n mf~tt:hru ClltcraUy, 
bNbaria.u or ~ftftdtih)J tt may br! argued th.ii(, as far as th4! MimAq1s1 jg conc;:crned. in lh~ Q.Jrikd· 
mating: criteria, (iii) is not i:.vi:n ner;~$S~l'Y. whil~ (i) is more or k&s QJttlingcot, and (ii) is both 
necessary and ddinitive. 
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scripture-this so1,.1rce would be net:essarily personal, or paur&11eya; or (b) by 
auributins lhc Ved:a 10 a beginningless and timeless body of .. auth.orless words,"' 
with its own fixed or "originary" (autparrika) relation between the wQtds and 
their ineanin,gs-this source ·would be; deemed apaur"$1?yat non-personal or, 
pc:rhaps, ··1rans-per~on4l."' Kumarila chose to assen the latter bi::cause he 
tegan;led the iruri as bcginningless and ru..llhorlcss. Thal is to say t the teaching or 
the Veda is without beginning, for in its present fonn the scripture stretches 
backwards through the unintcm,1pted su~cession of lcacbers and students to the 
very beginning when it was given along witb the universe and su'bsei;iuently 
.. seen'• or .. heard" by the primordial ••seers'" {r~it). The Veda as S\ICh is without 
an ~uthor, hum:an or divine; moreover, were it authored it would of necessity be 
flawed by 'he author's imperfct:tions, and ils authority thus diminished. 11 "'~li­
datcs it~df insofai.r as it is the sole sour"' of knowledge about matters that extend 
beyond the senses.• 
Thus the Veda was there from. the beginning of the manifest univen;e and 
remains independent of the will or authorship of a transcendent being or God_ 
God who might be ~oni::eive.d of as the original source and author of che Veda is 
thereby unnecessary; or He is necessary only for revivifyina the Japscd or lost 
"self-revealing" scripture. Hence. a "'divine revelation"' as Mcribtd, say, to the 
JJJdaeo-Chrjstian scriptures is ruled out. 
Accordingly, cz.rhtism seems to be a distinct possibility. ls thi15 the ~l.JnilflSl 
position? If so, how tenable: is it within the tislik" frame of reference, and is it 
consisten1 within the received Hindu tradition'P ls it coherent on other accountS7 
Our disi;ussion will b~ i;:onfined to thi: first two questions. 
lll. THE CONTRARY POSITION 
Oanganatha Jha is most forceful and copsistent in his examination of th~ claim 
under disput~. He refers directly 10 Kumirila's texts: 
Ku.marila's views with re.g:i.rd to Gqd arcl! found in the SJokavdrttiha, Sambondhlilct~· 
paparihara chapter. He also denies the ~rcation (.tlok'2 #41) and dissolulion (#68) ofthe 
'For furlbcr dj!)cussioo on lhc MinsAtpsA. vii;w of ··iut.J)orlc:!is ti:Xt" and its C<Jl'l'ipa.risons wi\h 
Western 1hi::ori<ts of Rcv;l:;iliQn and lancuaec. :see Purusotlama Silil'Wloria, ··on che Idea or AuUmtless 
RcvcJ.,1iorii (Apai..r11n·1~)." i11 Ro)' W. ~rretl, ed .• lndign Pliil1;1:raph)I of R~lirir:m (Dordn=l;lhl: }{luwer 
Pr.1bl~hing Comp;n'IY. 1989), pp. 1"4l-fi6. On M1milfl~ i&nd Nyl)'D. thi:.QTil!:!J of language:, Bilimoria. 
~abd.aprama~g: Word ond Knowledge • .A. Dortri~i: in N.,voya-Mlm~'1'16. Phllosopl1y, Towards 11 
FrorrwworkfOI" $r11li'"&IN~f1lD.f1}'ll fDordrcch•: D . .ReidclJKluftT, 1988}. Sec also0 J. A. 8. van Builcn~. 
"lnlrodu~ion, ·• Tl•t! Blr.r.1gtJ.widgF1ti in 1he Mofldblip""" CCh.1~1£0: Uni\!, Chicago Press, lft3). 
l'fhc: .nro~gc&t as.$Cni1;111 n-ji:c1ins a11pli~rl0it of the cpitbec "'oilhi!!ism" to lhe Mi'm.Srpsl, on 'tie 
grounds th.;.!\ lh.is would diSCJllillify 11'c school rrom 1he 1b1ika uadition, it; 10 be found in Piif<Upathinath 
Shas,ri's In1tod11.C'tion 10 tht Pllr.-a Mrnrli'Md. (Calcutta~ A. N. flhatl.acharya. 1923~ ;2nd edidon; 
Ch::u1lchamba Oric:n101Jia Varantii. l9BO). pp. 9-13, and pa&orim. Shastri invokii=s M hi.s authorit)' the 
veteran Max MilUcr. ¥'ho rrni.di;:. ~imilar dcren:sc. Sh;t$ui•s suppo&ition, however. that iistilro Cfttaila 
'"belief in Oo4"' c:1.11rtot be supported, $ir1e:i: ·'belief in God"' i$ not a sufficii;nt i;onc!ilian for one 10 be 
an <l':rriu; oind. ccin1rwiwlsc, bc:lief in Ou! suptcma~y of the: Vedoi do.:s not C\n\Pil belier la God. Sell! 
note 5 above. ·• 
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universe as a whole {#I l3); he basi:a; hi$ de:t\ial of the creator on the same grounds as 
that of the 'omniscient person· (#47-59, # 114-116). 5 
Let us see how Kumarila develops this crjti.quc. 
1. Kumarila Against the Cosmological Atgument 
First of all, Kum!lrila considers some circumst~n~ial evtdence that mighr 
support the view or the crnation of the world. Some schools are of the opinion 
that the. univi::rse is subject to a. periodic proc.c:ss of c~ation and dissolu.tion 
attrib~tecl to lhe personal God, known in Vc:dk litetature as Prajapali. Kdtnili.rila, 
however1 takes a rathc:r skeptical stance on su~h c'aims. (Indeed his form of 
skepticism might remind one, but only just, of David Hume.) He sets up the 
following questions: 
At a time whi:::n all Ibis (earth. w::lt~r. etc.). did not exist, what could have be.en the 
COl\dition or the universe? As for Prajapati HitnSielf. Wh~t cotdd be °flis position? -and 
what His wnn? 
And at that tim~ (when no men existed) wba would know Him and explain His c:haractel' 
10 the later created pcr50n~7 (If it be bc:ld that He cantiot be perceived by any man, 
then) wit.hou:t perception. (or cognition of ~ome sort, by somi: person). how can. we 
determine this (fac.t or His e-:itt$tcncc)? 
Them again, in what manner do you believe the world to ha11e had a beginning in tirne1 
(Ir it be held that ir is brovsht about by :a desite on the part of Prajiqlati. then) since: 
'fn:iapati i.i; (held to be) withouc a material body, etc .• how could He have aitY dosir~ 
towanls ctear:ion? 
(Slokavarttik:i, = sv; Sambandhlk~i:paparihara, = s; #4.5-47)" 
Evidently, what worries Kumarila is that we cannot have: any notion of what the 
world was like prior to the supp0:icd creation and how it actuat!y came about. For 
what could lhi: beings who first appr:arcd understand? What kind of cognition 
could they have had to record these events? Could th~)' have understood. from 
where and how they had suddenly come abour, and what the state of things were 
prior to the creation? Could they even have understood thaC Prajapati was the 
cr~tor (SV s#SS-59)? At best we can make inferences on the basis of and in 
analogy with what we know now~ but it is questionable whether we: can infer from 
/ 
IQangam,thi\ Jha, Indian Thought ~rle.s, B;!l'l~re$ Hir'ldu Ur.ive:rs.ity. Benare9, l904, vol. 11. 'P· 162, 
ri=pi:;ai.:il in his 'fhir PrilbhuU.ra SchoQr of P,iir.·a 1trmu171sci lDl!llhi: Mcnil:il Bl\n:.i.rsiJ;:iu, I ~n:H. p. 88; 
s.imilal' clisaussion& also O.i;l;IAr in l\is l'ii.rvd MrmurrisJ fo. irr Sorm:n, p. 13SlT. 
'Slukat1llf'f1fluz of K11m'4rih.1 Duns.. with commentilf)I NyiiJ-4lrau1iik11r1J of P1nh:uarathi MiM::i., 
Prn.i:hyabharari Sc:ric:s JO, ed. :ind rev. SWaml Dvarikud;mc Siutri (Voir311a~i! Tu.ta PubJicatioas, l978J. 
SV "" Slol"1vlirr1ikG. I. :itvi :a "Sambandl1ak1~papari~rr:z" = $, £Q]k1wtd by·•#" lo indicate ~lokt:1 
or verse rer<:rred ll), Etlglish lc:xts arc frvm o .. 11g;m.~ttia Iha's ltanslation Df Sloka"'4rtiika (1: la1"l«lpada 
scCti(ln) with ~tracts from wmmen•a.rie$ Kt1Jika of Sucarita Mi~ra aml Ny(jya.rrJtnii.karo of P.irthas· 
Aralbi Mi~ra. 8Lbliothl!:tica lndica 146 (Cn.l~una: Asia.1ic Society of Bengal, 1900--1'1081: repri11\i=d .5in 
Garib Du OricntoiJ $11;!.ries. No. 8 (De.lhi: Sri Sat&Uru Publii;ilti1;1115. 19831. p. :J.!i6. R~ri:.-.,nco eo Jh;i'~ 
tran~lation. is indicalcd in par~the~e!l:. 1boush his translation i11 nQt re.liable in some in-:t.t:t.ftcc!li. (I h'1vc 
i::ited hi$ tr.ap.Sla.tioa af1cr cross-1::hoi;:kil'lB wit~ !h~ .:.righ'llll and c.omment.:t.rfo.1 works.) Th.; i;:(>i'nftl~rttary 
n:fcrnd tQ in th~lc:AC ai-id nOld is P6rUms.lra1hi Miir.1"s Nydyaru1nfilttt1YJ, · 
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su~h 0 c'\lidc:nce" anylhing about \he ~tate of the whole universe in some remote 
past. 
KumiriJa re~sons that in order to create a material and corporeal wodd, either 
there bas to be some pre--existing sobstance from which the ct·cation is possible, 
or Prajapati has a material body which is riot etern~I and out of which he creates 
or "emanates .. the world. (We are llcre reminded of the classical Western maxim: 
~x nihilo nihil fit .J In either case. one would have to explain Prs.japati's coming to 
obiain such a body. or else accept the prior existence of material substance or 
matter. In the hmcr ca~c. we would ha"e to explain the origin of matter. or 
postulate another creator or universal cau$e responsible for this~ a~d yet another 
for this, ad infinirum (SV .s#48-49, #il and comrn.). Altemativcly, if Prajapati 
has a body that is not crested, then this too would have to be explaincdi for "His 
body too mus1 have had a beginning. inasmuch as it is also a body. like ours 
(made up of conslitue:nt parts)" {SV s#77). Suppose that God's body i~ cau!a 
sui. That is, God is the ground of his own body, which is therefore. essentially 
uncreated. Kumjrila again would want to question the cssendalism implied here 
in regard to corporeality. Besides, ifGod"s body were uncreated, why can we not 
assume that of ourselves, since we also have corporeal bodies: 0 lf His 'body is 
everlasting, ours must also be everlasting. " 1Q The commentator considers this 
c<>nsequence to be absurd. 
More seriously, Kumirila expresses conc~l'n that ~n if we were to assume 
that the world had its origin in GQd's all·powerful desire or •·will" to create the 
world. given that the worJd has a. matierial (conslituent) nature and has to be 
brought into bein.s aPd manipulated somcWhcre iri the process~ this would require 
a more rigorous explanation than has been forthcoming. In other words. how can 
an eternal God be said to po:ssess a non-eternal body. as would be the case if the 
world were formed or born Crom it'J Would not a pi:rfect God degrade Hirn.self by 
workill& with or through a transient body? One miah1 5ay in reply 1hat (iod bas 
full ~ontrol over the wotld-body by virtue of His inte.lliaence. will, etc .• just as a 
potter does when be produces a pot. But Ibis analogy of the pot'ter- using his 
int~Uigenc;e to form or mold a pol does not bold, for the potter does not bave full 
control over the constituents or the potf namely, the clay~ etc .• let alone over his 
own body. Thus this analogy does not help explain •'creation" as w~ are tc 
understand it (SV s#74, 78). Further, if .. c:onirol .. by intemgence were all that 
was necessary, then we could say as w~U that the collective intelligence of all 
sentient beings 1hrough their action brings aboui creation. Wbat th~n "WOuld be so 
spJendid abOllt God's inti:lligencc and actian in relation. to wha' we arc also in 
conlact with. i.c:., our own minds? In any case, the superintcndjng function of a 
supra-natural inlelligence is nol es(.ablished (SV s#74-76). 
Kumirila i5, in part, addressing the eosmological argument of the Nyiya 
ration.nt theists. But Kumirila might have missed some af the subtleties of the 
reasoned arguments and causal assumptions whkh the Naiyayikas (followers of 
the Nyaya) came !JP with, The Nyiya relies on inference (anumano) believing 
lhal il is possible to have ktaowledge. of things which c:3n never be perceived or 
ditecdy known, on the basis of our knowledge of the class of thirtgs already 
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known or knowable [hrough direct perception. 11 Ood is the eJCti-eme. case of the 
unknown. A simple infen:nce is formulated on the basis of an analogy of lhc 
agency involved in the creation of a. piece of art, or a. pot from clay; the appeal is 
co causality. since agency is one fonn of causality_ ln most general terms. every 
finite cause (i.e .• every cause: of which we have experience.). whether £ormal7 
material. final. or efficient, entaits an agency or an efficient cause to brin~ it 
about. 1~ As in 1hi= production of a. ceta.m.ic, the clay is shaped on a revol·Jing 
wheel, and the knct1din,g of the clay as well as the motion or the wheel is trai::ed 
back. to some person, Vi:t .• the potter. The argument is in r~spect to the karya1va 
or being-an-effect, whieh is causally linked lo an agent. (The possible infinite 
regress argumeat involved in this was not c:ru.cial to the Naiyiyikas. so we snall 
ignore that.} Uddyotakara (500-600 C.E.) developed some initial arguments 
hinted at in the early Nyiya treatise of Gautama (?200 C.E.). Udrlyotakara.•s 
formulation runs. something like this: the different things in naturv (phy.sis) such 
as grass. shoots. earth. etc., must have an agent just as manut':.tcturcd things 
(1ech11e) such as pots, cloth. etc. have an agent. which in the case of the pot is 
tht potter. And the cause of the natural effectst such as grass. eant •• etc •• is Odd. 
Centuries tatc:r, Cangeta (1300-1400 C.E.), the founder of the Navya-nyiya or 
.. new logic .. school. took up the simple il'lference (ksityiidi sakli.rcrkatri karyati,..at 
ghaJavot), unp9.cked it into its (fc.ur) Gonstituten.ts parts, eonsidered and exam-
ined its possible reronnulations, and wove an extrem,:ly sophist~cated defense of 
the inferenc:e, answering all possible. objc:ccioris raised against the:. validity Qf the 
inferential process involv~. He offered his own formula.lion based on a contplex 
reasoning by parity and conducted in favor of the i:xisti::nce ofOodt theomaiscient 
Being who knows and directs thi: beginningless ftux. of .atom.$, dyadst triads, and 
the: .. unsce:n etfectuaHty'" (adr~/a). a.nd who through his all-extensive desire 
creates the world. •J 
Basic:aUy. what the Nyiya position ar,gues is that '"beins-an~effect~ .. as in the 
case of pots, extends to the wofld as well; that .. havlng·an·agcnt" likewise applies 
to both, since it clearly is the case with (the) pot; and to staci:: otherwise would bt: 
contradictory. 14 But God. in this view, doi:s not have to produce through his 
bodily activity or agenc:y caeh and every particular thing, not does God havr: to 
promulgate every effecl that we see and experience in the world. It follows that 
Ood does not have: to possess knowlcdgi: of the particulars or be the direct cause 
of their e:rd.stence. God is the format and universaf efficient cause (invoking lhc. 
rule that the c.au.se of the universal is the universal}, a.tad there are other finite 
efficient and material causes that bring abo..tt tbe particular thing:3 and events as 
there are in the world. Thus God depends, in part, on human effott to create the 
world. In orhcr words 1 God 'knows the ~otiv~ and g¢neral principles involved in 
the production of things in the world, but He does not .acru~Uy involve Hirns;elf in 
11Joho V~Utll\ky, GQrig~!llt.'1 Philosophy o/God CAdyoar. Ady01r Rt:~arch and LibrJCY c~iurc. l98S), 
p. JU. 
!IStric:tly :spi;l'kins thi!I is Ariuo1fo's four-fold divi$iOl'I or causC"I; the Nya)'<l b:&!tic:llly recoi:ni.:~$ 
two: cffi~ient and. m:i.te1'i3J C3W1.Cs. under which format and final causes are respectively subsumed. 
l'{Q.- i5 the I'!!! ir1 the Nylya onro!or;y the di!tinctlon bl!ltween necessary ::i.nd ;:ontingcnt cauafit !"l!:fatians. 
uvattanky. p. 1156, pp. 40811'. 
11/bid., p. 204, ~nd a.l~o pp. 326ff'. 
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the process: He has, as it were~ a remote telic and instrumental control over the 
world. 
God indeed works in mystc:rious ways. In the final analysis, however. the God 
of Nyaya~ since He does not create the world e~ nihilo, or out of His own body 
as a spider spins a web from its bowels. is redoced to something like the deroiurge 
oC Plato, who a~ architc~t forms the world out of a prc..exisling set of conditions 
zi.rtd substance (vi2.., by ci1Jusing the atoms to come foto mutual contact), maintains 
a continuous rclation!lhip wi\h the universe as its preserver, and dissolves the 
world when conditions requjre it to be dissolved. This is as far as the cosmogonic 
necessity of God caa be taken. 
Agairt, the Mrmaqisakas repJy is unequivocal; if 'he. basic substance of the 
world i11 no\ crc:.ated by God. then hew does Ood's desire move the insentient 
.!tUb:;tanc:e (1.iotoms, etc:.) to organize: itsc:lf into 1;.reation (SV sit1'8J-82}? Doe~ He:: 
engage in some son of 1:1.etivity? And how does God manage this without a body? 
What kind of '-agency" is involved (SV s#82-8l)? J_fGod is the First Mover, who 
moves God? Could we stm say 1hat He is the "creator~~ Godt even if He were 
known in form (SV s#~8}? Presumably, we are speaking of something far beyond 
the scale of opennion involved in the pottet' rnaking his pot, the clockmaker his 
clock, or ahe spider spinning a web from withi111 its body, or even the 11eom 
generating lhe oak trc~-" A\ this point, something like the Humean crunch comes 
in as Kumirila concludes!. "There the theory of Creation and nissolution must 
be admi\.ted io rcs~mble the every·day process~s (of production ;and de.struction); 
and any particular id~ of 'hesc: with regard to the production and destruction of 
1.be whole universe cannot be established. for want of proofs" (SV i;;-#113). The 
rea5oning here is that a mere logical possibility does not eslabJish a necessity 
with any certainty. 
We are here reminded of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and 
the doubts that he expre.ues 1hrOUJlb Philo in takins ··operations or one part of 
nature upon another for the fouridation or ow- judgement conceT'J1ing the origin of 
the whole {which 'never can be ad1t1iucd). " 1• TIJat is to say, the doubt is with 
regard to takinc empirical insaani;:es. such as a clockmaker making a clock or the 
oraanic processes of pla.nts and animals, as modeJs for the principles governing 
ihe pJanets and the univcne at large. We have not witnessed another universe 
being created, as we see c1od:makers making clocks, poners creating pots, etc.~ 
thus no parallels e-an be dl'awn here- And from limited col'\iunctions in our relative 
field of ex.peric:ncc., we cannot go on to generalize about the process or origin of 
the order and structure or the uni'l'erS4': as a whole. The a.naJogie:s and reasoning 
the Nyaya has advanced, while they may be suggestive of a Jogical possibiliry. 
provide only weak justification? and in thcmselvc$.. Kumarila argues, lack the 
force to convince one ihat such is neccs$ar.i1y the: ease. namely. that the universe 
as a whole has a cause. 1' 
Further. from a r~nitc: world of experience we can infer only tinite ••origins" 
'l()n ··spidvr's web;' set SV sl'51 (pp. 356 .. 51). a. Hume's ridii:ulc oflhc Brahmil1'$ spider-web 
cosinogO!ly, and his guBrdcd commendP,ion tor th~ i\OYcllY of •ne: anatg&Y! David Hume, Dialogues 
Canctrtting M1tu,aJ Rrfiaion, in R1tme on Ri!ligion, ed. and intro. by Richard WoDheim (Cila:scow: 
Fon~.a.na/Cotlins, l 963), p. 154. 
1~Hume, Dial11c11u. p. lll -
"/b1'd., pp. 120-15. 
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and contingi::nt causal connections; the ramifications of this inference wilt, how-
ever, not be acceptable to the theist. This attituae of skeptlcism is basi::d, in part. 
on the recognition of the iimitations of h~man reason, in particular of inferential 
reasoning, and on grounds of evidence which tend to suggest otherwise (e.g., the 
forest on a marooned island had no conscious agent as its cause~ unlike the tree 
in my suburban garden). Kumirila therefore pronounces: Hit •s not at all neces-
sary for people who are conscious of their bodies, to have: an idea ot Creation 
and Dissolution, beyond (their own bodies), with rcgatd to [he whole universe. nu 
The major logical ·grounds for Hl.lme • s doubt about causality. for which he is 
rnosl Camous. were not articulated with th.e same philosophical rigor by the 
Mimi.IJlsa.kas, who were nonetheless predisposed towatds a healthy doubt about 
persopal agcney that extends beyond the imme:diately ~xperknced world. To be 
sure, they "pJa.y safe" on the iarg:=r iuue of causality, for too radical a eriticism 
of causality would 1.1ndermine the MimaQJsa's own commitment to a more abstract 
principle of causality-indctd. impersonal agency-as is imptic:sd h1 their doctrine 
of apilrva 01" .. unseen poteni.;:y, 0 and certainly in the: law or karma (where Hume 
and all Indian skeptic~. including the Buddhists, part company). The Mimamsakas 
chide the Nyiya for its admission of the adrstcz, the ~£up.seen eff~ctuatiry, ·~ which 
is said to be the rep0sitory of dharm11. and ocllr.armC1. (merits and demerits), and 
·which is also effective in the deli11'ery of "goods"" of the world~ and of liberation. 
What need is there. then, for a Jllperior sentient agent? The earlier V.aiscsika. 
("aiomist• 1 school, whose developed ontology is largely adopted by the Nyiiya) 
was content to explain U.e unity and ft.it1ctionins of the world on the ba.si.5 or the 
interaction or- fusion-effect of the uncreaud atoms (substance) a1uj souh (desire) 
and the pridcipk of adr1fa (efficiency), thereby ruling out the neceJsity of God. 
Dharma, by thi:: same token. circumscribes the im:personaJ moral comsmncnt of 
the universe. · 
2. The Moral Argument 
There is, bowcvc:r. apas-t from thr:: appeal to causaHty, another reason that some 
Nruyayikas found persuasi,,e for inferring tile guiding band of God. This amounts 
to a moral argument, namely. the "ecessity to account for the dispensation of the 
fniits of actions, which result ftom peoplc"s ptevious merhs and de.merits. Unless 
there wer~ an aJl .. knowing divine and intelligent agent, how could we conceive 
this [O be possibte? Surely, as we have just remarked, the Nyaya believes that 
actions create the unseen effectua\ity (adu!u.), much like the o.purv'1 of the. 
Mlm.aipsa~ but that in itself this is an inert property which ci:mtinues into the life 
hereafter. Uddyotakara therefore reasons: uThe same argument holds good here 
also: the merit and demerit of the dead people need to be activatc:d b;r an 
intelligent agent. Only being activated by a.n intelligent agent. do the eh:ments 
(eanh, fire:, wat~r) up to air operate in their ri:spectivc fur1ctions. like hofding and 
so on."•!>' lrt other words, there has to be: a superintendent being such as God who 
arranges a pcJ"Son's rebirth and dispenses: the appropriate results in the new~bom 
body. 
11sv 9~112 (p. l68). See :i.lso Hum• O!I rl:!-cxami\'lacion or the: prinaple. "Likt Etfc:CL'li pfOYC like 
causes," IJ:uc V. Diolorr1ei, p. 138, 
11•\lat"'n.k.y, p.,2.S. . 
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The Mimaqtsakas bring two objections 38ainsr this argument, while agreeing 
with the Nyaya tha1. in the absence of actions cf huMan beings there would be no 
adr;/a, and hence no result or fruits- First, why would God, who is supposed to 
be impartial to all creatures~ act in such a way as to bring a.bout disproportionate 
fruits7 Why would a kind and loving Ood allow such an iniquitous situation? It 
dh~rma (as :merits and demerits) were absolutely under His control, why sho~ld 
there be pain (in the world) (SV =.;=#82-83}? If on the one hand the activity of the 
world were to be dependent upon (l.e., £egula.ted by) thcs~ (dh"rma. etc.), theu 
this would entail accepting something else (i.e., a.n agency other than God's 
dcsjte). But this would also dcprivr: God of His .inde~endence. If on .thi; other 
hand w~ ai::~i::pt (iod't:. will or d~sirc:. 1his would undermine the Jaw of karma~ that 
taotwithstanding, God•s will still mu~l have a cause Hf it is to activate dliarma-
adhorma). fo that (:ase, the cdr.$Ja might as well be accepted as the c•use (of 
everything) (SV s#72-73). Again, .u Hu~ w.ould later put it, sini;e there is so 
much pain and suffering. we have \O assume either two world-powers, one working 
far good and th1; other for evil. or else a sincle morally neutral creator.20 
Second, asks KumariJa, i5 it so very inconeeivablc thal people's own ac:tions 
could direc\fy bring about the 11;sults'1 ls not the law of karma a su.fncicnt 
postulate: to c:Jtplain the process of dispensation'? And if the law of kafma is 
inexorable, then what is the place and necessity of God? Or. alternatively, jf God 
is so powerful, ean He not annul lhat law (SV s#53, c::p.mm.)? Moreover. if there 
were 'Some end a~solutcly esst.ntial to be achieved. could not God achieve this 
without needing to create the world, a -world in which He is then said to destroy 
(SV s#.S4t ~7)? 
Some Naiyiyikas respond by suQg;csting that God mcTeJy crcares the auxiliary 
causes by which individual dispensations take place, so that God does not have 
to attend to a.nd deal with each ~d every individual action or t.he unseen. Or, as 
Newton might have said, Cod does not mQve His ••hidden hand'' ot directly 
intervene each time an apflle: falls; the law of gt"avity, which God built into the 
universe, tak~ care of lhat. Presumably, the Naiyiyikas michl concede that there 
is an autonomous and inexorable operation of the law of karma; they are, 
however~ also quick to poinl gut 1hat Goo is both above merits and demerits 
(dharma~adhDTma) and that the law of karma is subordinate to GOO. That is to 
say, it is only when God activates the merits and demerits of the individual souls 
that the just reward to each soul is meted out. 
The standard M9'11\13.fl\Si rebuttal of the last position is that if a soul cannot 
direct its own merJt and demerit .. neither can God, who is simply another soul (in 
the Nyiya view), do it. KumArila also doubts that God ~an ••per~eive" merits and 
demerits and that He has any co11.tact with bodies in which these are located. 
Kumarjla rules that it is unparshnonious to postulate an agency beyond the 
.. unseen'' ro a~coun1 for the dispi:nsation or rewards~ etc. Furthermore, it is 
possible to explain that [be world itself comes about as a. result of thr;: meritorious 
and the unmeritorious deeds of the eternalJy exisring individual souls. Actions af 
people J)rocl:ucc apurva, al\d it is this unseen potency that is effective in bringing 
a.bout things through which the fmits arc enjoyed. etc. This aspect of the 
cosmogony is not dC\'eloped by KumarUa, although tbhi appea.r.i to be the 
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accept~d account of the J\lli.mamsa's doctrine of ucontinuous creationism" 
(namely. that the pt0posed theory must be: i:onsistent with the everyday processes 
of becoming and disappearint1 cf. #113. cited earlier). Kumirila reinforces this 
by remarking that "we could onfy admit of" a gradual process of creation1 such as 
we see in the case: of present living beings (creating the jar. etc.). ":ti 
3. The Problem of "Evil" 
10 diminish the N'yaya moral argument fol" Ocd''i l"ole in the crcatiOr'l of rhe 
universe, Kumari1a. once again invokes the pcrcnniill uproblem of evil" aad takes 
it a. seep furthr;r in order to disetedit the existence or the .supposed (benevolent) 
Creator. To Kumllr•ta the Nyiya account appears incoherent in light of the 
problem it creates Ln regatd to the quaJities attributed to God. He thus asks; 
Then. again, in the fitst place, h11W is it that He should ha\le a de:sirc to crc:atc a world 
which is to be fraught with all sorts of trcn.1bles to living beings7 For at the time {of the 
b~ginning of c:reation) Hi= has r10t gor any guiding .agencies, in the shape Gt V'irtue: (or 
sin) clC:., of the living beings the1ttselves.zz · 
If one were to insist that God created the world, C.hen Cod would have to bear 
the blame for the ••evil" that exists in the world. Would any conception of Ood 
as the all-loving and omnipotent bcipg eountenani::e such a fundamental discrep· 
ancy'? This indeed is not an uncommon argument used tor denying-or at tea.st 
for castiiig serious do\l'bt upon.-the existence of the Creator-being in other, non-
lndia.(1, skeptical und phi1osophica.I traditions, as we h:ilvc: already noted in the 
"NOrk of Hume. The disconcerting problem in the MimaJ:!lsa ar the broadly India.ti 
discourse was not so much with (what elsewhere ha.s been tcmu:d) '"evu;· as 
with the Overwhelming (act Of pain a11d a life of disprgportiOl'late adversities Qr 
$Uffcring (du/:rklia) 4 and the cyc:lical recurrem;c of death after death (3a:l!Lfdt'a). 
The: Buddhists had added further weight to this perception and developed it witb 
niuch greater atlalytical rigor. 
Kumarila next considers the suggestion thar God or Prajapati might have 
c:Ratcd the world out of pity. He is puzzled by this suggestion. and wonders for 
whom would God have had pity or compassion in the absence of beings (prior to 
creation) {SV s"52)? 
Now if God were so moved by sheet Compassion (for whomever). why did He 
not create: either just happy bcini;.s: or ad everlasting happy world'? Was it so 
beyond His will not to create a world of miserably painful c:r~atures'?u It did not, 
however, accur to the MimJinsaka that God could have created a world. in which 
-pain and pleasure, good and bad (or .. evil .. ) are finely poised in an equilibrium 
whii:h human striving attempts ultimately to ~iitnscend and be liberated from. 
lnd~ed. the Nyiya, and to an extent thi: V~<lanta, seem to hav~ i:spoused sueh a 
position; not so the Mimiqtsi. And, of course, thi:: cause of suffering may well be 
attributed to the sheer f'olly of humans who fail to recogni~e or adhere to God's 
moral plan. Besides, suffering could have iis roots in the iU"'sion-making power. 
11SV s#t\? (p. 3S9). 
usy ''"9-SO (p. 356). 
31SV $ fS2-S4 (P- 3..57). 
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(md)'a) peopJ~ hav~ been loathe to shun. God~ all things being eq\lal, has the 'hc:st 
of antentions-or maybe in His infil\he wisdom He remains indifferent to human 
suffering. for He bas made the best of ~I possible. worlds. 
Perhaps, ponders Kumirila, God created the world merely for His own amuse-
mentor .. play~· (Ind)~ as the Vedilntins say and as it is often narrated in folklore 
·and mythology. To K.umarila's way ofthinking, however. such a God would thert 
only be an incredibly selfish being. ~ing down upon Himself a good deal of 
rrouble and gucstioning.N 
This, then, would no1 only eon.tradict the theory that God is pc:rie.ctly happy. 
bot woutd Involve Him in mud~ wearisome toil. Kumarila does not believe it 
coni;eivabJc that thcr'e could be a supremely <;Ompassion1E1tc God who would 
cre:ne. a world run of pain and advc:rsity mr:rcfy for- Hsport ... But if amusement 
\Yere Ood"s intention, then, again, Kumarila cannot see how God could be said to 
be self-fulfilled and infinitely conte:nted.?J One supposes that here Kuman1a is 
questioning the claim to perfection in Oocl, who nonetheless must resort to an 
imperfect crcalion to find 1astb15 fuJfillment. Kuntin1a wonder5 why any theory 
would want to ground itself. and its Ood, in such contradictoTy positions. If any 
artist's c:reation were to be maned by imperf e.ctions, how wou.ld he or she claim 
Co be perfect! . 
Against those who claim that God create$ and then after many mmcnnia Qf 
normalcy ()•u8a.s) destroys or brings about a. dissolu1ion Qf the world-a culmi· 
natin.g proces5 known in Hindu cosmo.eony as pralayc:z-the Mtmirpsaka unr 
leashes the scurrilous charge aha! ibis entails an aWf ul suicidal. &end.ency on lhe 
part of such a God (SV s#68 and comm.). lt is beyond Mimamsi logic why the 
goop God would wish such a universal dissolution, aoy rnore than the leader of a 
kingdom would condemn his entire ~itiienry to the gallows in order to rid the 
kingdotn or thugs and robbers. 
Perhaps what this shows is the Mim~sa.·~ reluctance ta take seriously analog-
ical thinking, wbatevi=.t it:s limitations, and to c.onsidcr how we might begin 10 
.understand that wbkh extends beyond ordinary human experience. The MimiJ11-
saka was undoubtedly a stickler for not going beyond the immediately given. and 
in some ways was more positivist than the modern-day positivists. The irony, 
though. is that the Mjm~sa had no qualms about accepting the .idea of apurva 
or 1.hC ··unseen potency,'' attrfbutcd as it is to human action. and which seems to 
work with the same degree of automation as docs the complex system of switches 
· and si.gnals used for controlling the operation of space shutdes-._ The .reality of 
:rvarga. the heaven.Jilte ••kingdom of endst" is another of Mimamsi's commit-
ments. as aJso i$ the belief in the eternity and plurality of individulll souls. Surely, 
on such maners~ •he Mimams! displays a distini:t oon-nsturalistic tendency •nd 
appears 10 rest its faith on what goes be}'ond the pcrci::ptible~ In themselves, 
however, these '"imperceptibJes'' arc not \he elass, of ••trancendcntals" as any 
standard theistic system wauld wish to suppose. The ''world beyond,·~ or 1hc 
"othcr·worldJy'' reality •. is not :1omcihing remov~d from the bounds of hu:rnan 
Tea1ity. Even the gods or deities w~o are invoked in ritual sacrifices as ... wit-
14SV ~1"5113 and ~ommc-nu1ry (p, l$7). 
DJ bid, 
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ncsses'' to human offering~ do not fulfil! the ru~ction that Ood fulfill:; in, for 
ins[ance, the Nyaya view. 
4. Evidenc.e in the Veda 
Could scripture be the grounds for establishing the existenci: of God the 
Creator? Some, especially the Na.iyayikas and the Vcdintins like R!unfi.nuja 
(Sribhd,rya on BS I i 3), argue that the assertion about God's creation is to be 
read in the Veda itself. The scripture further speaks in one voice of the creation 
ofth~ world and the Veda. Inde~d. ,.fl.g Veda X.90.9 appears lo speak of the Veda 
as having originated from the Primordial ... Man•• (Puru;a) in a cosmic sacrifice 
orchestrated by the gods. The Upan.i1ads, notably thi; Mut1<iaka Ul. l.4), speak of 
rbc Veda. as having cma~ated from BrahmM. Again, the Brdho.ma~as attn'"bute 
the emergence of the Veda to the gods. namely, Agni (Fire)t Vdyu (Wind). Adicya 
(Sun). Els~where, Brahma." is d=scribed as having .. breathed forth" (n.i(iivasita) 
the Veda (Brhadtirottyaka Upo.nisad ll.4.10, IV.S.U}. Most impfcssiitely, the isa 
(l.i) and SvetaJvatara (Vl.18) Upani1ads speak of the pervasiveness or the. 
Supreme Lord. who gave the Vcd.a to Brahma (himself lookc.d upon as the 
ucrr:ator•' aspect of God). 
The Mimamsaka, again, dismissc:s such cla.lins with more than a touch of 
cynicism, for he considers the passages to be unrellable. Rather, these ate to be: 
interpreted metaphorically because they fall undc:r the category of artha...,adas or 
auxiliary statements, whose explicit purport is to eulogize and praise the: central 
theme of the primary ritual text (vidhi.s). But there is another reason why they 
might be thought to be unreliable-as we shall mention shortly. But it seems odd 
that a Mi~saka. would dcela.re the V~da ta be unre1iablc. lf the Veda is 
untrustworthy. one might then 4lSk 1 how could the Mima.tpsa sustain the claim 
thar: the Veda is infaUibte? The following n:sponse, which by any standard would 
seem to be prezc:ntious, i5 made:= ••• . . because even though He may not have 
Cfeated the world, He might speak of having dono so. in. ordc:r to .show alf Ris 
great p0wer. "Zlli 
Commenting on. this disavowal, P-arthasirachi Mitra is quick to point out that it 
is not at all the; intention or his master to admit to lhe existence of' God; rather, 
such aa assertion about God and so on is to be expected ln a (sac.red) narrative. 
Thus the MtJhabhar(J.ro. and the f'urdrr.as. th~ literature from the smrti traditiQn., 
fondly speak of creation emanating from Prajapati. But such ••sEory•lclliPg, H 
argues Kurniirila, is to be constn.ied as being secondary to the primary intention-
ality of th~ text. whose b;ssic aim b to coax the individual coward::i pro par ~ctioa.. 
rightful 4U.ty, and a. mgtally ~ompeUing '"form of Ufe. "~7 
In such a minimalist reading of.th~ ·text on.e need not assume the:: intentionallty 
of an "intelligent being": the text speaks for itseU', it has no precursor other than 
anoth~r text; and it contains Wlthin its linguistic stnu;:tute the pc.t~ntialicy Uab-
dasalai} for its own hermeneutics. Wh~rc thi: text appet1.rs to ma.kl::l reference to 
an auth()r, it docs :;;o by way of naJTative device. which. however, is nol central to 
its primary thesis pertaining largely to iaj\lnctions abtnlt duty. Thus. since none 
ot' these references to creation is contingent· upon. the a;1rncy of an ext~rnal 




int~Uiac.nce~ or a .. first stirrer:· there is little m~ed to accept 1be. creator God. 
Considct also chat. on J.hc. one hand, had the scripture come after creation. then 
it 1;ould not have recorded any impressions at the moment of creation. and hence 
such knowledge would have to be secondhand. If, on the Qthet hand, the sc'ripture 
preceded acation, then its uuerances on creation would: be a priori (SV s#6 l-
62). What if the scripture. wss cre.ated with the universe? KumiiriJa mishr reply 
that this i' an instance of yet :another mylh-making st.ory intended to-distra.ct the 
believers and detrac1ars alike. 
God. then1 on the accounts considered above, does not appear lo the MTma:IJlSi 
to be l.\ very useful postulate. fot c)C.plaining the .;re.a.ti.on of the world and the 
workings of the destiny of each human being. p.;ople1s action rbroiigh the 
insirumentality of the apurva is respons,bJ~ for the coming~into-bcing of the 
world, and SQ there t5 no need to suppose thi:lt this process has to be controUcd 
and regulated by any supernatural (persooal) agency. Rather, the laws of action~ 
rcuibution. of sacrifice-result, of duty-n:ward etc., operate, as ir were., autornati .. 
c:aUy t 8Utonomous1y, and inexorably, as do the so<alled laws of nature identified 
m the sciences; and they do not stand in need of a regulative inte.tligent principle 
as implied in. any postulation about a creator Ood. 
s. The Argument from Scripture 
Another va.riatiQn of the argument from sc:ripture which Kum!rila examines is 
the Nyaya attempt to argue for the existence of God on the _grounds of the 
authority and sanctity of the Veda in respect to its pronouncem11:.nts on Dharm.a 
(''La~.n}. whic:b Nylya readily acc~p.t.s as an independent moral c;oncept. 1he 
Ny~ya rti.tionalis1s championed the following argument; the remarkable authori-
tative and trustworthy c:haractcristics of the Veda, as wen as its internal structure, 
!':us.gest a transcendental source of superior eminence, who alone is. capaole of 
such insights and ethical rectitude in His conccm for sou't'ld human ac:tion and 
welfare. It is inconceivable, contended these rationali~ts (and as Udaya.na, c. 90t)... 
J200 C.E.~ later fonnaliicdn), that any being other than one wbo is tJmniscieot 
:and most benevolent w~mld ltave been moved to "reveal" to an ignorant human 
l'aee su<::h eievatin,g aJtd pristine ltu~hs as ue embodied in the Veda. 
In other words, the impeccability and infallibility of the scripture inevitably 
point to a sQun:e or an author that cannot 'but be omniscient. Thus7 Ood is ta be 
accepted on accuunt of 1he inviofabiliry of the word of 5cripture (and not lhe 
other way around, oamely, that •'revelation" is at:cepled because it is the word 
of God). Common sease resists the susscstion tha.t an.y art (or ''text'') is ever 
without an artist (or 0 c.reator"') who. moreover, has auributes whic:b. are rather 
special to him or her_ -
At best, thi:s argument of the Nyiya (with the. familiar Tlwmist. ring co it) 
unwittin.g)y introduces the susc;estion that the Veda mu.:$t ha"e been. authored. 
The Mimarnsa is not prepared seriously 16 entertain this view, not bccausr; of 
what it docs or does not establish in respei;;t to God. but because of what it 
;aisi::~ ~n'l.muy afUdayAM'S ar,sum~l'\t in G•orgc Chcmparaihy, ltidion Raclonal Theology (Vienna~ 
de Nobili Jlest.arc.h Library scric.$, 1~n,); -and si:c s1:<:\ion on th~ l'Jytiya iU'g,Ument io "'Hindu dtc:octicy! 
Sani.:arn and Rth'J1Anuja on :Brah,nan," ln Rdigiaiu Jrrvt::1lg111ioM. Study Ouldc and ftc;ulor, Philo&o-
plly or R.c:l~on (G:cfong, Vic.; D~kin Univ., 15'87)_ 
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attempts to establish in respect to the origin of the: Veda. Kumaril.a finds thE 
Nyiya line of reasoning to be utterly unpersuasive and highly spccu\ative. There 
L~ no good reascn to suppose that the virtues and sanctity or the scripture point 
to any source beyond itsr:lf. As Sankara was to do more forcefully after him (BSB 
n ii 38).~ Kumirila points out a circular•ty in the Nyiya argument, namelyp that 
first the omniscience of Ood is demonstrated on the basis of the authoritative 
character of the sii;ripru~. and then the authority of the scripturi; is established or 
co.Wrmed on the: grounds of the omoiscieace of God. What ~idenci: is thc::re~ 
Kumarifa asks, for the actual authorship of the scripture iti questiofl'! Sui;::h an 
author has never been observed, and if the scripture mentions an author or 
authonJ the refere:clce is either to mythi~al beinss pr to names of persons. such 
as Ka~haka, whg, were entrusted with recitiag particulat portions of the Veda.» 
lie rcjei=ts the Nyaya ••proof" on the same grounds on which he rejects all forms 
Gf the ··veda by design"' argument; for the Veda was not fashioned or issu=d by 
any bcrine. 
Might not. however, the acceptam::e of a supreme being a.,i;; author of the 
scripture: serve to vindicate the infallibility of the Veda? Kumatila'3 tesponse to 
this question is an emphatic .. No!" For, giveo thar the Veda is already regarded 
as infallible, Kurnlrila thinks it fruit1ess to attempt to locate its origin in an 
in(allible hems- Or, to do so would undetinine lhe iaf'allibility of the Veda.J• 
Furthennore, if the Veda \S' to be regarded as a creatiott of GOd, it might be 
difficult to acce:pt all that is said there about God, for the simple reason that we 
cannot aecept just anything anyoni: says about himself or herself. in script1.1tes or 
elsewhere (see earlier #60)_ But to col.lnter this response .:ute mt!St first demand 
proof that the Veda is unauthori1ative and falHble, lest the opinions thc.-cin be 
dismissed as false and unreliable. But fol'" the Nyaya. this PoSitioa can be 
sueeessfully opposed by proving the i:;;dstenee. of an infallible a11tbor of the Veda.. 
In defense of his master. however. :Parthasaratbi MiSra musters this quixotic 
reply; 
But durn. tbis in.fallible author too would depend vpon the Veda for proof of" bis 
exisceoce; and Uie infallibility of 1h~ Veda tesdng upop the infallibility of such an author. 
th~ reasoning would l!lec:ome a. f;:ak of afguing in a cirdc_u. 
rt is i[ldeed curious that a divine author wDuld need to rely on the V~da fol'" 
proof of His own existcmce. But this puzzle is not pointless, for according to 
legend Brahma., the demiurge-arthitect of the world, is said to have wa.ndered. 
the Veda clasped in one hand~ from Ol\e corner of tne universe: to another. looking 
fo.- his owa origin. before he dba.ppearcd down a lotus stem into Vi~i:su's navel. 
The upshot or all this is that a theorist would not consider postulating an author 
had he not'l1cceptcd th~ possibility of an irtdependent scripture_ But if there is no 
good rea[lon to doubt the authenticity of the scripturcJ then an author (as source 
of its :iuthority) need not be assumed. 
-i.BSI) - Brahmtuiltr(l•Bh~rya c>f Sankara, ~. J_ L Stiastii. with Rqrm.fprtt.tJffti. Blrtimari tmd 
NytJyafl/n,laya (Delhi; MotilaJ Banantidass, 1£'80,1:, 
MSe~ Srokavomika s~tion on Ap.Ruru,1qa ("avthorlcu text") l (tarkapada) ~~vii-10.,>;;11ii, pp. SSlff. 
llSV ffl a11d corn.nu:niary {p. 3$8). The. :second p31'1: of Lhe arsu.mcnt h drav.m fl'Of1\ $l(lkavdmika's 
Codan.a.-.11itra l.~-69-7() and comrMOtAl')I (p. "'i sec also Jl692-9J, 98-IOJ under same 1ri1ra (pp- .J.4- · 
35), 
1iCamm1:g,aty 1.1ndi:c SV CGda1t'1"'.$iilra #'69 (Jh;a. transl<\tion, ll- Jl}, 
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lt is clear also that Kumarita wants to place the onus of proof on the opponent. 
Furthermore, Kumarila wonders how the omniscience: of such ·a superior being 
could be kN>wn or tc(:Ognizcd unless there were other omDisci~nt beinp. But 
tbeist:s like the Naiyayikas want to argue for only one omniscient being. The 
Mim9.fJ1Saka is prened lo say. it may be surmised, that even if there were an 
•·onu1is~ient .. being or person who know$ of His own e:xincncc. He would 
11one1beless know what js in the Veda-viz., the c;::atc:gorica1 imp~ratives of 
Dharmq or Htrificiat '·duly" as means to the promotion of a mote frujz.ful a.nd 
Jibera.tc.d existence, here and hereafter. Hence His existence would be made 
redundant by dint of the fact that the knowledge Mc wo1..1ld possess is already 
conta.incd in the Veda. lo thi: final anaJysis, since all that is ~uired is th~ 
rc=a.!i:iation of the tnnh of Eh~ assertion that "Dharm.a is knowable by the Veda 
aloiu~. ·~ the Mimaqtsa is not obliged to prove or acii;ept the omniscience of any 
being. human or djvine." 
6. KumariJa•s Worries about Oml\isciencc 
From Kum.arila's point of view. an ornniscic:11t being would at bf;st be "" 
rtieiooym (for the Veda) and would at worst 1tot be very kind (in view of the 
magnitude of $&Jff erlng in the world), and is therefo:re not a desirable postuJatc. 
The cruci~I point of thi: Mimirpsi argument is centered in thi.s discussion of 
authorship and espedally of •·omniscience~~· which we should here emphasize o. 
little more. After rejecting the Ny.a.ya evidence. whose basis is an inference 
positing a God ovel' and above the Veda, Kumarila ne:xt rejects an)' suggestion 
whatsoever of a being who is omniscient, on the grounds that ordinary humans. 
not themselves omniscient, would have no way of determining the omniscience of 
any being. KumarjJa's motives, however, go much deeper than simply expressing 
diffieulty of an epistemolo,gical kind. Clearly., his dispute is with the Ny~ya 
method~ il>c logician typkally first establishes the existence of God by means of 
inference (from ordinary experience) and then attributes the composition of the 
Veda to God. This is clearly not acceptable~ either from the logical OI" the cisrika 
point of view. 
In the crudal l/okas (SV s# 114-t 16). Kumirila questions whether he would 
accept the evidence of the existence Qf the Creator Ood on the very assumption 
on which one is expected to ac(ept the omniscien~e of a (human) being (sar ... 
vajnamuvam): .rarvajnavanni~edhya ca iira;rul) sadbhavakalpcuia? (SV s# 114). 
The Nyaya argoments seem to force one to do !O. But there is great danger in 
this move. which Kurnan1a is at pains to arrest. The real or implied 'intent of this 
nagglng doubt is broua;ht out rnther more cl~arly in Pirthasiirathi's elaboration on 
Kumarila 's forcsoing 1;ryptir; statement: yatha ca buddhadel,1 sarvajiiatvQ'fl pu~ 
rusatviidasmo.diidivan ni.,edhyo.m, evam prajapa:er(Jpi stras1ranram (N]ii.ytJl'al· 
nakat'Q s# l 14); 
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As 'he: omniscierice or the Buddha eat1not be proved from such sta.1~mcn.ts as 'H~ (th~ 
Buddha) is omniscie1u' bc1;;aus~ he was a man like our.se!vi:s, so is thi: creatarship of 
Prajap:ati (in daubc)_w 
The disquiet is not mctety with the claim in regard to creation, but with any 
arguments that purport to establish the omniscience. and thereby the: crea.torship 1 
of a person.al being • .such as of the Buddha. Suppose for now that Btic;fdha wrote 
the scripturr; in which he dc:scrib,;s himself as an omniscient pefSOP (sarvajna); 
should one naively trust this statement? Suppose also that someone else afti;r the 
Buddha. wrote this into the text; should one rely on this stat~ment without being 
critical of its authority? in the same way, then, even if we supposed the Veda was 
created by Ood and God therein speaks of His om.ni$cience, we should not rely 
on this statement (about His omniscience, etc.). 
Th.e fundamental criticism is here cmbedd~d in the simile usarvajiiaw:z.r: Uke 
the omniscience." The omo.isciem:e alluded to. however. is precisely th~ omnis-
cience of the: Buddha claimed by his followers. The worry Is that, given lhc very 
Himsy grounds on '\o\rhich the Nyaya is prr:p"-t"ed to accept the omniscience of the . 
supposed author of the scripture, what is the.1,'e to prevent the Buddha ftom 
,claiming to b= om11i.s.::ientt the. creator of the world and the authority. above:: all 
authority, particularly that of the Veda? The Veda~ then, would shrink in its 
signiti~ancc, and Hinduism would sutfi:r a f1,.1rUier assault. Ir, on the other hand? 
it could be shown that the authority of the: Veda logicany precedes Prajapati (the 
Ood of creation), then it would follow that Prajapati knows what is already 
contained in the Veda, for no knowledge (about Dharmu., right actiol'ls, etc.) is 
possible without the Vc.da {SV s#ll5). Kumirila concludes, therefore, that we 
must a~cept that. the Veda was prior to cTcat.ion OI" to the: existence of" aay sentii;pr. 
bi::ins- If the Nyaya r~fuscs to accept this thesis, what hope i$ there that the 
Buddhists wil1 accept it and refrain from thinking that another omniscieot beit1g, 
such as the Buddha himself. has knowledge: supc:rior to that of the Veda? (We 
may sp~culate wh.ethe:r a. Veda-believing; omniscient Buddha would have ca.used 
less ota problem for the Mim&rps.iL They would, howevQr, still qu~stion the need 
for two infallible a.uthoc-ities-viz., the Veda and the Buddha_) 
I"V. CONCLUSION 
From the rore,eoing discussion it ~P?=al'"s that Rluch of Kumarlla·s critique: and 
attempted deconstruction of the thert prevailing arguments for the: cx.iste:nce and 
absolute nature of God could be attributed to his need to respond to the Buddhist 
onsJaught against the Brahman.ical faith in the authority of the Veda. AJthough it 
is said that the Buddha remained mute Ort Ehe question of the cxistcnc:e of Ood 
and Hi~ rQle in religious dis~oursc, the: a.vowed non.-thei~m of his follower!!. was 
an is:sur; or some c:onc:em tQ many a Hindu. But it was the attack on the Veda that 
was by f.a.r the more sc:nsit.ive issue for the orthodQx Brahm.anical ~chools. H~m:~. 
' ~NycJyaf'a.tndkal'tJ on SY s# 114. Iii~ iO be noted thu.t Jha's translation ofthiS; f$ unreliable. (or h~ 
avoids mcnrion of I.he Buddha. which acru:illy gc:curs in lhe i;:omm8nt.Vl". Ku~!rila in SV Codo1'111.sU.1ra 
#95-96 (p, JS) mi=aliorls. thi!! Buddha by name and n:mark:; thA.T.. lhc iluddh:L"!I assc:r!.ioo, ~ with all 
ttumun asserifon, is no~ immut1e rmm dcfect!I and impcr£e~itu1s, s"ggt!!!lting that tile Bu<l4hlli is nat io 
bi= reprdi:rl :&$ bi:il'lg l)l'hni~de:nt (SV !l-t'119). Sec also SV Ci7tlana:rGzra "11147-59, # l I 4•117, ud # l2!1-
l38; #169--172: fll4$-t47. 
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lei)ding the rebuttal. the Mimarpsak.as .;oncenLrated their effor\s ~n addressing 
Lh.c latter issue. Further. the Nyiya attempt to e~tablish the existence of God on 
the basis of inferen(ial reasoning, and by accepting the scripture as the creation 
of an omniscii::nt author, simply opened up a Pa,ndora•s box that might allow 
recognition of the sanctity of imy authorial text or scripture~ as well as evoke 
similar claims to omniscience on behalf of the Buddha and other fundamental 
foundcn of religions. For tho Mirna.rpsa, all or 1hcse would appear ro be highly 
deirimcntaJ to Hindu orthodo::ii;y. 
Now il is possibre that Kum~riJa had com:t to disbelief in God, or that thi!S; had 
bec:n rcinforeed whilr. (as it is 50nti:;:litnc~ c1aimcd35) he was wi\h the Buddhist~) or 
that he was a Buddhist himself. Eut he eouid not reconcile bimse!f 10 this di~belie.f 
or secmins- act of ap0stJS)', even while he campaigned to raise the status of the 
Veda. Clearly, neither would he ~ccept the omnisi;ience of any hwnan teacher or 
;i.uthor (a"cwr). He had folJnd in the Veda a pre-esti.'lblished, ~tbeit impersonal, 
authority; hem~t: the.re wa:s no need for him to accept a.ay perso11al .. a.uthor/ity .. 
(aut;lorbas) whether hum~n or divine. The thrust of 'the argumcJ1t in the passages 
we have considered 'bus appears to be tjn,ged with these conflicts, which Kumarila 
may well have attempted to resolve in him$elf. Why else would he consider so 
si:aio\.lsly the Nyaya locution about .. omniscience,•? particularly human omrus .. 
c:ience, which he then tries to refute? Certainly, he had 10 counter the Nyiya 
c:l.ahns in respect to omniscience of the Creator God. But Kumari1a did not stop 
at that: for omnisc.ien<;e js omnfscie11ce., whether its locus is human or divine. 
In ~ondusion, then, several inter-connec:ted motives appear to have been at the 
core of the Mimarpsa skepticism about assertions for tbe cxistc:ncc of God: 
1} Ar9umen1s based on inference (anzu11a11a) would tend to elevate the capacity 
of R.ason beyond its reach: for the impressions that we have through sense-data 
do not su,Qgc:st any :such necessary infen:ntial links (vyapl1); if anything~ creation-
dissoJution seems to be a continuous proc:ess. (This is a kind of Humean 
skepticism.) 
2) A trartscend~ntal deduction with respect to dharma-(l.dharma would point to 
the reality of iapuYlli::r (unseen efficient potency), thereby ruling out the necessity 
of a supreme apportioner or s\lperintender of h\.lman ;actions; besides, this 
explains better th~ ubiquitous problem of --evil" and suffering. (This is moral-
thebdike skepticism.) 
3) To admit creatorship on the assumption of omniscience opens the way for 
more than one omniscient being and esp~cially for the Buddha's claim lo omnis-
cience, and perhaps even bis creatorship; or it tolls the e.n<l to belief in the world 
•~sec Kavir.lj, not~ 3 abOVC', p. ix; arid CINlrlcs Eliot, /lind«i~m (H'UI Bilddliism; An lii~cori~I S"-~tt:h 
(3 va!a.) (LondQn; Roudcdg~ &. Kegiltl P;u.11, 1Sll J-1922). vol. ~. p. I JO, p. 207 (re:prfotcd l'le:w Jl!:rscy; 
Banics 1.u•d Nobll!', 1962). Kavir.rl f<!ports: a iradilioJt rccDl'dcd in Tibc:tui works ~ccording 10 which 
Kotnirila 'mt :. dcbitll:: to Oharmakini and n1~rrupon became i1 Buddnist. Olher llCCOl)l'ltS lH.1£8t:SI that 
K11marila. lcs1 fa.ilh 111 Buddhism :is well, dcfill:d tiis tca~tt. and sllfftred lo!.s 00' "001! eye" during :a 
'WSBCr wh.h BuddhiS\:s as hi:! attc.mp1cd tb rc-.a~se:rt hi!I belief in 1~ Veda., (n orclei- to c:l'pini.e h'5 
hl!:reii.cal "sin!!" and to reverse hi!I th~omai;l'. Kumlin1G i~ beli't?Ve"d ro have anempli::d 10 immol~te 
him~ir. Since, ho~vr::r, he had o. lot or apQrvll (presumably mcritorious ones ahQ) scored up, h.is 
body smoldered whhou\ itJcini:tating; thus he litaYCd consi;iou:s Q( hi'S srate for an 1mmcn$cly lons 
lime. LI:gcl'ld h;;is it that ne> <i11c. l!(ll cvc.n gsn~ar.a who arrived bWT-lo-~-centqty l&•.,r, couJd t01lk the:: 
dcspQindent :icholiJ.l"·llrown.skcptic. om of his miserable scJf.annih[fation (a bir like lh~ ::;ujcidM 
t~nd~m:ics of :sor:tte lautr,.,(lay cxistcptfali.:s.is). 
104 
MIMA/lrfSA DECONSTRUCTION 499 
altogether, more particularly, belief in everlasting souls, "kingdom of ends" 
(sv4tga), aod the efficacy of rlu.n~ls; likewise, the er\d to reliance on evidence of" 
fiicripture on such matters. Heri:: personal omniscience is ri=:jected. (This is onto-
logo.s skepticism.) 
4) A supt'eme personal being independent of thr: Veda undermines th~ finality 
and absoluteness of the Veda, whose authorles.sness is in peed of urgent <.te(ensc 
which would also vindi.cate the autonomy or the moral taw (Dhr;.rma.). (This is 
authorial skepticism.) 
5) Since the Buddhists did not evolve any such doctrine of opau.ru$eyQfva or 
••authorless revelation" as had the M'imaqisa,J' that in itself is sufficient for 
preserving the orthodox.pheterodox (O.~tiko.-ttiJ.stika) distinction, and, therefore. 
for upholding the orthodoxy or Mrmafflsfi., if not of Hinduism al large. (The 
erstwhile orthodox-hctetodox Jlf.leranr:e shifts to Hauthoriessncss•• for its au-
thenticating mark.) 
This d.oes not prove conclusiveb' that the Mim&l:l\saka, although by any stan-
dards a double,. and possibly also an apostate, is an atheist, OE" ·p:afly that be is a 
theist. But it does show rhal this apolo$eticist from the most orthodox and 
pn:surna.bly dogmatic of Hindu a:c:hools is an agriosric. It is, lhc:n, not such a 
heresy or blasphemy, at )east within one of the wor-ld's majol" th.20.philosophia 
traditions, ro can into doubr thee reality of the Transr;endent and to be:: opets to 
tbeomachy. 
Finally, from Hume, an anecdote that Kumari\a might have taken a curious 
delight in (and added his own nuance as lo the. form of •'religion .. one returns to): 
Don't you remember, said PHILO, die excc.tlcnt sa.yine: of LORD BACON on thb bead 
(whether atheist and sc~p1ie are synonymous)'? That a litlle phUQsophy, replied CLE· 
ANTHES, makes 3 r:nan an A•haist:; a great dc<Lf r;onvcrts him to rcligion.11 
""St~ 110tl!: fi above. 
n();tJJog"es, p. J 11-
105 
